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Abstract 
This Article argues that religion is an important source and dimension of modern 
human rights, and it surveys the historical and contemporary rights contributions of each 
of the major world religions – Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam. It then surveys the place of religion in modern international human rights 
norms, and calls for stronger protections, especially for minority faiths. 
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Introduction 
Rights talk has become a dominant mode of political, legal, and moral discourse, 
especially since the second half of the twentieth century.  Today, human rights 
protections and violations are increasingly important issues in international relations and 
diplomacy.  Often overlooked is the fact that most rights and liberties have millennia-
long roots in legal systems shaped by religious and philosophical tenets.  Indeed, 
religious beliefs provide perhaps the most widely accepted foundations on which human 
rights law has been built.  Some religions ground the origins of humanity in a creation 
that imbues all persons with a divine spark, entitling each individual to equal respect.  
Many religions and moral philosophies address fundamental ethical and moral 
questions of justice and the “right” life, inevitably considering questions of how power 
should be exercised and what duties individuals owe to each other.  As Paul Gordon 
Lauren has observed, “All of the major religions of the world seek in one way or another 
to speak to the issue of human responsibility to others. … [A]ll of the great religious 
traditions share a universal interest in addressing the integrity, worth, and dignity of all 
persons and, consequently, the duty toward other people who suffer without 
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distinction.”1  By developing their values, ideals, and concepts of responsibility to 
common humanity, religious traditions provided an inherent beginning for the evolution 
of rights discourse. 
This chapter focuses on the comparative development of human rights beliefs 
and norms in Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity.  
Although the focus is on the religious sources of and contributions to human rights, the 
chapter also attends to the ambivalences and tensions around religion and human 
rights that remain the subject of ongoing debate.  The concluding section argues both 
that human rights need the resources of all religious traditions to survive and flourish, 
and that religions themselves must attend to human rights in order to do justice and 
affirm human dignity.2 
1. Religion and Human Rights in the East 
1.1 Hinduism.   
Inquiry into the sources and development of human rights in Eastern religions 
must begin with Hinduism, which emerged out of the cultures and practices of the 
peoples of the Indus Valley prior to 2000 B.C.E. Unlike most other world religions, 
Hinduism has neither origins in a particular leader or historical event, nor a set of 
determinate doctrines.  Over time and across the Indian subcontinent, it has embraced 
a diversity of religious practices, texts, and rituals.  The tradition’s mystical quality and 
spiritual objective of each person attaining freedom from material existence has 
sometimes caused it to seem otherworldly and unconcerned with such tangible matters 
as the realization of human rights.3  The modern association of Hinduism with the caste 
system, the widow-sacrifice known as sati and other forms of gender inequality, and the 
ongoing tensions with non-Hindu inhabitants of the subcontinent have all been cited 
against the Hindu record of human rights.  Yet,  Hinduism’s traditional respect for 
tolerance, diversity, and harmony, and the timeless example of Mahatma Gandhi’s ethic 
of nonviolence, also suggest important sources and resources for human rights in the 
Hindu tradition. 
 The Hindu concern for harmony amid the diversity of its forms is captured 
in the early texts known as the Vedas, particularly in the emphasis on Brahman, a 
concept of a transcendent, eternal, and absolute reality beyond the plurality, diversity, 
 
1   Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 5. 
2 This chapter draws and distills the following books that also include detailed citations to the literature: 
John Witte, Jr., The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); John Witte, Jr. and M. Christian Green, eds., Religion 
and Human Rights: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); John Witte, Jr. and Frank 
S. Alexander, eds., Christianity and Human Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); John 
Witte, Jr., and Johan D. van der Vyver, eds.  Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, 2 vols. (The 
Hague:  Martinus Nijhoff 1996). 
3 Exemplary of this stereotype is Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and 
Buddhism, trans. and ed. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958). 
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and contingency of the material world. The subset of Vedas known as the Upanishads 
contain the elements of what would come to be identified as Hindu philosophy. In light 
of the diversity of its deities, practices, and beliefs, Hinduism has often been considered 
to be more philosophical than theological in its conception. Key Hindu ideas include the 
concept of reincarnation through which believers eventually escape the cycle of death 
and rebirth (samsara), and the moral force of causation and consequence (karma) 
flowing from their actions within those cycles.  Various schools of Indian philosophy and 
practice focus on the cultivation of physical, spiritual, and intellectual discipline for 
attaining liberation (moksha) from these cycles of earthly existence. This goal of 
transcendence does not take away from the joy and reverence for life (ahimsa) 
apparent in colorful and ornate Hindu rituals and practices.  This reverence extends 
famously not only to human life, but also the lives of animals, some of which are 
designated sacred, and more generally to life in all its forms.   
The divinity that Hindus see as resting in every human being is inseparable from 
the divinity manifest throughout creation.  This expansive sense of the divine includes a 
number of deities, alongside a more over-arching sense of the divine, identified with the 
concept of Brahman.  This theistic diversity is accompanied by understanding of history 
as occurring cycles of activity rather than a simply linear progression.  Within the Hindu 
tradition, the human self (atman) is conceived in a certain sense as transcending 
historical time and space, existing as an eternal soul without beginning or end. These 
multiple and diverse senses of divinity and temporality, along with the plurality of rituals 
and beliefs that make up the Hindu tradition are suggestive of a profound concern for 
both universality and particularity, two concepts that are central, but often in tension, in 
human rights today.   
The emphasis on individual spiritual development in Hinduism can seem purely 
individualistic, with no obvious connection to broader notions of human rights or social 
justice, but the fundamentals of a Hindu social ethic are encapsulated in the notion of 
duty (dharma) as a principle of social organization, particularly as outlined in the 
dharma-shastra manuals of rules and right conduct practiced in the Vedic schools.  The 
framing of many of these dharma discussions in terms of the Hindu concept of the 
needs of different stages of life (ashramas) (studenthood, householdership, retirement 
and renunciation) connects dharma duties to specific rights to material sustenance 
(kama), adequate legal, political, and economic structures (artha), the pursuit of law and 
justice (dharma), and the quest for liberation (moksha).4 These protections of social, 
economic, and cultural rights to kama and artha, and of civil and political rights, 
including religious rights, to dharma and moksha, have resonance with modern 
conventions guaranteeing human rights in international law.   
In light of India’s extensive interaction with the West through the presence of 
British and other colonial authorities, it is not surprising that ongoing tensions around 
human rights in Hinduism have roots in how the tradition was constructed in the minds 
of missionaries and colonizers.  As Werner Menski, a scholar of Hindu law and religion, 
 
4 See Arvind Sharma, Hinduism and Human Rights: A Conceptual Approach (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
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has observed, “Well before the Christian era, Vedic Hindus, Buddhists, and Jains 
battled over the right way to lead a good life for all humans, and even other creatures. It 
is here that the literate Brahmin elite of ancient India allegedly first began to assert its 
privileged position and built an elaborate empire of ritual precision, higher 
consciousness and ultimately right knowledge and action, to claim privilege and power 
to the exclusion, potentially, of all other humans. This led many analysts to claim that 
the Brahmins did not develop human rights, but elaborated only their own caste-based 
interests.”5  
In Menski’s analysis, the missionaries of yore may, in some respects, have held 
a more positive view of Hinduism and human rights than today’s human rights scholars 
and advocates.  The missionaries “turned themselves into social workers and virtual 
anthropologists,” Menski maintains, in a way that “led them to acknowledge a common 
humanity with Hindus, and even more positive attitudes towards Hinduism.” This 
attitude is in stark contrast to the many human rights activists who today “myopically 
treat anything Hindu as incapable of addressing human rights concepts,”6 pointing to 
“backward customs such as sati (the burning of widows on the husband’s funeral pyre), 
forced marriages, dowry demands, frantic killings of non-believers in communal riots, 
and, of course, multiple caste-based discriminations.”7  Such concerns about matters of 
caste and gender are far from resolved, as evidenced by the recent extensive debate 
about a proposal to include a question about caste in the Indian Census of 2011.8  The 
rates of sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, child marriage, and dowry murders 
continue to raise concerns about the status of women in Hindu culture, especially in 
India.9 In addition, the rise of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 
1990s drew international attention to the implications of religious nationalism for 
tolerance and pluralism.  The BJP challenged both India’s constitutional secularism and 
what the party perceived as negative depictions of Hinduism at home and abroad.  
Incidents of communal violence with BJP connections have  drawn international 
attention,10 raising concerns about the capacity of the recent nationalist and political 
 
5 Werner Menski, “Hinduism and Human Rights,” in Religion and Human Rights, 77.  For a more 
expansive discussion of the relationship between traditional and modern interpretations of Hinduism in 
the law, see Werner Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
6 Menski, “Hinduism and Human Rights,” 79. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See “Census 2011 to Include Caste,” The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) May 7, 2010; Jason Overdorf, 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Count,” Global Post (Boston), June 5, 2010; D’Vera Cohn “India’s Census 
and the Caste Question,” Pew Research Center, June 9, 2010; “India Approves Caste-Based Census,” 
BBC News, August 10, 2010. 
9 For further analysis of the status of women in India and the Hindu tradition, see Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
10  In 2002, Muslim mobs in the Indian state of Gujarat attacked a train carrying Hindu activists returning 
from a Hindu religious site at Ayodhya, previously the site of the 500-year-old Babri mosque that was 
demolished by a Hindu mob in 1992.  In a tenth-anniversary attack, the Muslim mobs set two train cars on 
fire, sending fifty-eight passengers to horrific deaths.  In response, Hindu mobs destroyed Muslim 
businesses, reportedly raped Muslim women, and killed nearly a thousand Indian Muslims.  For analysis 
of these and other aspects of Hindu nationalism, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Clash Within: 
5 
 
iterations of Hinduism to engage in the toleration and religious pluralism that many see 
as necessary supports for human rights. 
Scholars and practitioners of non-Western religions are right to point out, as 
Menski has, that the human rights community, reflecting a strong Western presumption 
of separation of religion from law and politics, often overlooks the more subtle 
relationships among religion, culture, and society—including the potential for religion to 
be a positive source of support for human rights.  The Hindu tolerance of a multiplicity 
and diversity of beliefs, deities, practices, and rituals—along with the over-arching 
ethical principle of dharma--is suggestive of a concern for both universality and harmony 
of rights and duties that can be the basis for Hindu understanding of human rights.  As 
leading Hindu scholar Arvind Sharma has explained, “Hinduism is conscious of its 
universalism because it considers consciousness to be the most universal dimension of 
existence.”11  What this means, Sharma adds, is that “Hinduism’s raison d’être should 
continue to be tolerance . . . the acceptance of all the religions of the world by all human 
beings as the inalienable religious heritage of every human being.”12  In other words, as 
Gandhi put it, “Christ can save, and Hindus can still be Hindus.”13 
1.2 Buddhism.   
Buddhism, like Hinduism and for some of the same reasons, has also often 
suffered from misunderstanding and mischaracterization in the West when it comes to 
human rights and social ethics. Buddhism emerged as an alternative offshoot from 
Hinduism in the sixth century B.C.E., when Prince Siddhartha Gautama, the son of a 
powerful ruler of a small Indian kingdom defied his father, left his wife and children 
behind, and set out to experience the world in his twenty-ninth year. A sage had foretold 
that the prince would become either an ascetic or a monarch.  His father had sought to 
prevent asceticism from flourishing by raising his son in a life of royal luxury.  Having 
never experienced human suffering, Gautama found the hardships of the world to be a 
rude awakening.  On his journey, he encountered a holy man who appeared to embody 
perfect happiness and serenity as a result of attaining complete liberation through 
enlightenment (nirvana) from worldly suffering.  The experience would eventually lead to 
Gautama’s awakening to compassion and benevolence, such that he would come to be 
known as Gautama Buddha, or more simply the Buddha, meaning the “enlightened 
one.”  The aim of Buddhist practice is for each person, in the manner of the Buddha, to 
realize through enlightenment the Buddha nature that exists within all sentient beings, 
but is concealed by the distortions of desire, anger, and ignorance.   
Buddhism shares with Hinduism the notions of dharma, karma, and liberation 
from the material world, but with a somewhat more unified doctrinal sense of how to 
 
Democracy, Religious Violence, and India’s Future (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University, 2007). 
11 Arvind Sharma, Are Human Rights Western?: A Contribution to the Dialogue of Civilizations (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 62 
12 Ibid., 94. 
13 Ibid., 113. 
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manage these along a path toward enlightenment.  Central among these principles are 
the Four Noble Truths, namely that: (1) life is suffering, (2) suffering is caused by 
craving and attachment, (3) craving and attachment can be overcome, (4) and that the 
road to this overcoming is the Eightfold Path.  The Eightfold Path includes: (1) right 
understanding, (2) right purpose, (3) right speech, (4) right conduct, (5) right livelihood, 
(6) right effort, (7) right alertness, and (8) right concentration.  There are important 
correlations between certain of these “rights”—for example, speech and livelihood—and 
the rights that have been protected in international human rights texts.  The concern for 
alertness and concentration might be the basis of educational and labor rights, or 
political rights of thought, conscience, and belief.  The ability to act in accordance with 
right understanding, purpose, conduct, and effort might be seen as the basis of political 
rights or broader rights of development.  Indeed, there are important resonances 
between the Buddhist Eightfold Path and human rights philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s 
list of basic human capabilities as a basis for human rights and development.14 
The mystical qualities of Buddhist enlightenment and emphasis on individual 
practice have caused Buddhism, like Hinduism, often to be perceived as disengaged 
from the worldly realm of human rights.  This perception of disengagement, however, 
has changed in recent decades, largely through the efforts of the contemporary social 
and political activist movements known as “Engaged Buddhism.” Sallie B. King, a 
leading scholar of Engaged Buddhism, describes these movements as having “deeply 
incorporated the language of human rights into their campaigns to bring about 
fundamental political changes in their home countries.”15 Indeed, King maintains, “While 
there is debate among Buddhist intellectuals about the extent to which the concept of 
human rights is compatible with Buddhist culture, Buddhist activists continue to rely 
heavily upon the language of human rights as an integral part of their work.”16 Admitting 
that “working out a properly Buddhist framework for understanding and justifying the use 
of human rights language is a complex business,” King maintains that “Buddhist 
intellectuals who embrace the notion of human rights have given thoughtful 
explanations of how they are able to ground this embrace of human rights in properly 
Buddhist concepts, principles, and values.”17  
The pursuit of this Buddhist foundation is complicated, King observes, by 
Buddhism’s formal lack of a concept of “rights.”   Nonetheless, she argues, “Buddhism 
does assign a high value to human beings, proclaims the inherent equality of human 
beings, and advocates for moral behavior, nonviolence, and human freedom. These 
traditional values form the foundation of Buddhist justifications for embracing human 
 
14 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2011), 33-34. 
15 King, 105.  See also Sallie B. King, Socially Engaged Buddhism (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2009); Sallie B. King, Being Benevolence: Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism (Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2006); Christopher S. Queen, Engaged Buddhism in the West (Somerville, 
MA: Wisdom Publications, 2000); Christopher S. Queen, Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation 
Movements in Asia (Albany, NY: State University of  New York Press, 1996). 
16 Ibid., 103. 
17 Ibid., 106. 
18 Ibid., 107. 
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rights.”18  King identifies five sources of Buddhist justification of human rights.19  First, 
Buddhism recognizes the inherent dignity of the human being in the teachings on the 
“preciousness of human birth” and innate and universal capacity for “human 
enlightenability” in all sentient beings.  All human beings possess this Buddha Nature. 
Second, the Five Lay Precepts of Buddhism against killing, theft, lies, sexual 
misconduct, and the ingestion of intoxicants set forth a moral code that gives “negative 
claim-rights” to those who might be harmed by these practices.  Third, the Buddhist 
tradition has a strong commitment to human equality, as manifest in the Buddha’s 
willingness to teach all who would listen and his principled rejection of the caste system.  
Fourth, Buddhism is strongly committed to an ethic of nonviolence and, more positively, 
to benevolence and compassion toward others. Finally, Buddhism is committed to 
human freedom, particularly by individuals in their decisions about their own spiritual 
path as determined by their own experience, rather than external sources. The 
Buddha’s dying words about this matter--with apologies to the later John Donne--are 
reported to have included the recommendation, “Be islands unto yourselves. . . . Be a 
refuge to yourselves.”20 This freedom principle, according to King, constitutes “one of 
the most thoroughly Buddhist of all potential Buddhist justifications for human rights: the 
freedom to pursue Buddhahood, or self-perfection, is our innate right as human beings, 
based upon the deepest level of our identity as human beings.”21  The principle of 
freedom could give rise to a “full list of human rights,” King maintains, on the basis of 
the recognition that they are important supports for “the pursuit of spiritual self-
development.”22  Extrapolating from self-development to social development, there is 
again resonance with Nussbaum’s basic human capabilities and related international 
human rights. The Buddhist tradition, through its core principles, the contemporary 
Engaged Buddhist movement, and such recent engagement as the “Saffron Revolution” 
uprising of Burmese monks against the authoritarian Myanmar government, is a 
repository of human rights wisdom and practice. 
1.3 Confucianism.   
In China, roughly contemporary with the development of Buddhism in India in the 
sixth-century B.C.E., a new ethical and philosophical system emerged in connection 
with the philosopher Confucius.  After Confucius’ death, the tradition was further 
developed in the fourth century B.C.E. by the philosophers Mencius and Xunzi. More of 
a moral and ethical philosophy than a religion, Confucianism sought to elaborate 
principles of ethical and humane administration of government as a means of political 
and social reform.  It emphasized personal moral development along with obedience to 
forms of proper conduct (li) dictated by different social relationships. The six 
relationships that are the focus of Confucianism are: (1) parent and child, (2) ruler and 
minister, (3) government officials, (4) husband and wife, (5) older and younger siblings, 
 
I can’t get rid of this space.  MCG:  This is where I had to make some changes to formatting to address 
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production editors can address it? 
19 Ibid., 106-09. 
20 Ibid., 108. 




and (6) friend to friend.  All of these relationships are understood to be founded upon a 
profound principle of benevolence, compassion, and love (jen). The profound emphasis 
on filial piety of children toward parents is a distinctive feature of Confucianism that has 
sometimes been grafted onto other relationships, particularly the political relationships 
between rulers and the ruled.  Family structures and virtues have, thus, been extended 
to other realms.23 But right relations in each of the six realms are thought to conduce to 
a general social harmony. 
Confucianism shares with Hinduism, Buddhism, and other Eastern religions an 
emphasis on humaneness, compassion, tolerance, harmony, and duty—all of which can 
contribute to a culture of human rights.  The notion of love (jen) that is properly manifest 
in relational conduct (li) incorporates an understanding of reciprocity that is often 
described as the Confucian “Golden Rule”--translated as “do not impose on others what 
you yourself do not desire.”24  Joseph Chan, a scholar of Confucian political thought, 
notes that this reciprocal aspect of the tradition extends beyond the conventional 
relationships in observing, “To be sure, Confucianism does place significant ethical 
constraints upon human action and a good number of these have to do with social roles. 
But it would be a mistake to think that Confucianism sees all duties, or rights if any, as 
arising solely from social relationships. . . . Although Confucianism does place great 
emphasis on relationships, it is not a purely role-based or relation-based ethics. 
Confucian ethics of benevolence is ultimately based upon a common humanity rather 
than differentiated social roles—it carries ethical implications beyond these roles. . . . 
Confucianism can accept non-role-based moral claims.”25 
In a related observation, Chan also debunks the stereotype of Confucianism as 
having an inescapably collectivist ethic.  “I think it is fair to say that Confucianism does 
not give importance to the idea of individuals freely choosing their own ends, whatever 
these ends may be,” Chan argues. “The emphasis is more on acting rightly than freely, 
and to act rightly is to act in accordance with one’s best understanding of the 
requirement of Confucian morality.  But Confucianism never denounces or belittles 
individual interests understood as the needs and legitimate desires of individuals.”26 As 
for the implications for international human rights, Chan maintains, “In light of this 
understanding, we may conclude not only that Confucian thought would not oppose 
basic individual interests as constituting the common good, but rather that it would take 
them as a basis for a legitimate social and political order.  So Confucianism would not 
reject human rights on the ground that they protect fundamental individual interests. . . . 
Social order and harmony can only be affirming and protecting people’s interests in 
security, material goods, social relationships, and fair treatment. On these issues, at 
 
23 For more on Confucian understandings of the family and society, see Patricia Buckley Ebrey, 
“Confucianism,” in Sex, Marriage, and World Religions, ed. Don S. Browning, M. Christian Green, and 
John Witte, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).  
24 Joseph C.W. Chan, “Confucianism and Human Rights,” in Religion and Human Rights: An Invitation 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 92. 
25 Ibid., 91-92. 
26 Ibid., 92. 
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least, there is no incompatibility between Confucianism and the concept of human 
rights.”27 
The main incompatibility that Chan sees between the Confucian tradition and 
human rights has to do with the difference between an instrumental function of human 
rights as an “important device to protect people’s fundamental interests” and a non-
instrumental function as “necessary expressions of human dignity or worth.”28 
Confucianism, Chan argues would agree with the former, but not the latter, accepting 
human rights in a “fallback-instrumental role,” rather than as an “abstract ideal” of 
human dignity, and resisting “any view that tightly links human dignity with rights as the 
capacity to make rights claims.”29  Thus, in Chan’s view, “Confucians would regard 
human rights as . . . important when virtuous relationships break down and mediation 
fails to reconcile conflicts. However, human rights are not necessary for human dignity 
or constitutive of human virtues. To avoid the rise of rights talk, Confucians would prefer 
to keep the list of human rights short.  They would restrict it to civil and political rights, 
not because social and economic needs are less important, but because these rights 
are more suitable for legal implementation.”30 
2. Religion and Human Rights in the West 
2.1 Judaism.   
Parallel to these developments in religion and human rights in the East, new 
understandings of rights were emerging in the deserts of the Middle East that would 
inform later rights understandings in the West.  The first of these, chronologically, was 
Judaism, which grew out of the Noahide Covenant with the Jews as the chosen people 
after the great flood and was reinforced with the Mosaic Covenant that included the 
Decalogue, or Ten Commandments. For David Novak, a scholar of Jewish religion and 
philosophy, the Jewish tradition raises the question “of whether a ‘human’ right can only 
be exercised by an individual or whether a human collective can exercise a right too,” 
particularly when it comes to “specifically Jewish duties,” that “only members of the 
covenant between God and Israel can exercise because they alone are the people 
obligated by the full Torah.”31  There are three kinds of rights in Judaism, Novak points 
out: “(1) those rights that God justifiably claims for himself, (2) natural rights that all 
humans justifiably claim for themselves, individually or collectively, and (3) Torah rights 
that Jews justifiably claim for themselves, individually or collectively.”32 Along with this 
third set of rights flowing from the covenant (ha-berit), the Jewish understanding of 
rights emphasizes normative commandments (mitsvot) as required by the covenant and 
by normative law (halakhah) as interpreted by Jewish rabbinical and legal authorities.  
 
27 Ibid., 93. 
28 Ibid., 94. 
29 Ibid., 97, 94. 
30 Ibid., 99. 
31 David Novak, “Jewish Theory of Human Rights,” in Religion and Human Rights: An Invitation, ed. John 
Witte, Jr. and M. Christian Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27. 
32 Ibid., 28. 
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The Jewish understanding of duty (mitsvah) is one in which “a right engenders a duty 
instead of a duty engendering a right.”33   
These rights and duties are manifest in relations between humans and God and 
between humans and other humans, including the relationship between the individual 
and the community.  That humans are created in the image of God (be-tselem elohim) 
is the basis for both the dignity of the human being in which “humans share with God 
the personal attributes of intellect and will” and the basis rights, including the specific 
right of religious freedom by which humans are “capable of being addressed by God” 
and possessed of the “capacity freely to accept or reject what God has commanded one 
to do.”34  In this way, religious freedom in Judaism is construed less as freedom of 
choice, than as freedom to assent to the invitation and command of God.  In relations 
between humans, Jews are to observe the biblical commandment “you shall love your 
neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18).  This rendering of the Golden Rule in the Jewish 
tradition is the foundation of the moral law, sometimes also encountered in the negative 
formulation of Rabbi Hillel the Elder: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow.”35  
Relations with fellow Jews are lived out under the understanding that they are both 
created in the image of God and fellow members of a covenant community.  Relations 
with non-Jews are governed by the principle pertaining to “resident sojourners” (ger 
toshav) under which non-Jews who accept the basic moral law can “enjoy the same civil 
rights and be obligated by the same duties as a full-fledged Jewish citizen of that 
polity.”36  Jews living in foreign lands, as many have in the course of various Jewish 
diasporas, are expected to adhere to the principle of dina d’malkhuta dina—“the law of 
the land is the law”—a principle of political obedience to the law, except where it 
conflicts with halakhah. Orthodox Jewish communities around the world retain rabbinical 
courts (bet din) charged with adjudicating matters of ritual law and personal status, 
including the issuance of bills of divorce. 
2.2 Islam.   
A second Middle Eastern religion, developing millennia later in the seventh 
century C.E., was Islam.  Muslim understandings of human rights have been a major 
topic of debate since the inception of the modern human rights regime that began with 
the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, but [tensions?] have increased in recent decades in 
the form of vocal challenges to Western human rights norms by some Islamist 
schools.37  Islam today is an extremely diverse and fast-growing religion, extending 
through large swaths of Africa and Asia, from Morocco to Indonesia, with sizeable 
immigrant communities in Europe and North America. Abdullahi An-Na’im, an Islamic 
 
33 Ibid., 30. 
34 Ibid., 31. 
35 Ibid., 35. 
36 Ibid., 36. 
37 See Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (Paris and London, September 19, 1981), 
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law scholar, argues that the framing of the discussion in terms of the compatibility of 
human rights with Islam is both problematic and counterproductive.  The compatibility 
argument  “assumes that there is a verifiably identifiable monolithic ‘Islam’ to be 
contrasted with a definitively settled preconceived notion of ‘human rights’,” when in 
light of the diversity and decentralized leadership structure of Islam, the “most anyone 
can legitimately speak of is his or her view of Islam, never Islam as such, and of human 
rights as they are accepted around the world, including by Muslims.”38   
Granting the necessary caveats about Muslim diversity and human rights 
universality, there are principles within Islam that can be seen as providing certain core 
commitments to human rights analogous to those of other world religions.  As Islamic 
legal scholars, Azizah Y. Al-Hibri and Raja M. El Habti have pointed out, “The Qur’an 
states that God created all humanity from a single nafs (soul or spirit), created from like 
nature its mate, and from the two made humanity into nations and tribes so that they 
may get to know each other, that is, to enjoy and learn from each other’s diversity. (Q. 
4:1, 49:13)  The only proper criterion for preference among people is that of piety, a 
quality achievable by anyone (Q. 49:13).”39  This principle has been interpreted as both 
an affirmation of Muslim diversity and a basis for gender equality.40 In interpreting these 
Qur’anic passages on diversity, they further note that “Muslim scholars permitted 
Muslims in various countries to import into their laws cultural norms that do not 
contradict Muslim law.”41 This principle allowed such practices as polygamy to exist in 
the Muslim world, though with limits on the number of wives and normative expectations 
of regarding equality that also reflect Muslim ambivalence about the justice of the 
marital relationships that may result, particularly for women.   
Other practices, such as “honor killings” for the crime of extramarital sex (zina) 
have been more widely proscribed under Islamic law. Other passages in the Qur’an 
suggest a basis for educational (Q. 39:9) and economic (Q. 4:32) rights for both men 
and women,42 a reflection of the concern for intellectual and social development in Islam 
that sustained centuries of Islamic scholarship and exchange of ideas with the West, 
along with economic development through the interest-free system of Islamic finance 
under Sharia.  Islam also contains a principle of religious freedom in the Qur’anic 
injunction that there can be “no compulsion in religion” (Q. 2:256), as well as principles 
protecting the religious rights of non-Muslims (dhimmis) residing in Muslim lands. 43 
 
38 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Islam and Human Rights,” in Religion and Human Rights: An Invitation, 
ed. John Witte and M. Christian Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 56. 
39 Azizah Y. Al-Hibri and Raja’ M. El Habti, “Islam,” in Sex, Marriage, and Family in World Religions, 151. 
40 For more on the status of women in Islam, see Riffat Hassan, “Rights of Women in Islamic 
Communities,” in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Religious Perspectives, ed. John Witte, 
Jr. and Johan D. Van der Vyver (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), 361-86. 
41 Al-Hibri and El Habti, “Islam,” 156. 
42 See ibid. 218-222. 
43 For a discussion of this principle against religious compulsion and related themes of tolerance and 
democracy in Islam, see Irene Oh, The Rights of God: Islam, Human Rights, and Comparative Ethics 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2007), esp. ch. 4. For discussion of the religious rights of 
dissidents and non-Muslims in Islam, see Donna E. Arzt, “The Treatment of Religious Dissidents Under 
Classical and Contemporary Islamic Law,” in Religious Human Rights, 387-454. 
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 The question of Sharia has been a prominent one in international human rights 
debates, particularly around the common practice of Muslim nations inserting 
reservations into international human rights agreements, pledging adherence only 
insofar as the content does not contradict Sharia.  Sharia is both a system of religious 
law and a moral code, including criminal and economic law and political and civil 
liberties, as well as areas of personal law dealing with sexuality, marriage, and family, 
and ritual laws addressing procedures for religious observance.  The 
comprehensiveness with which Sharia governs Muslim life, sometimes to the severe 
qualification—and sometimes abrogation—of human rights is a topic of particular 
concern.  As the Islamic scholar Hisham Hellyer has observed, “Religion in the Islamic 
sense ‘does not concede the dichotomy of the sacred and the profane’; it includes both 
the temporal and material world (al-dunya), and the world beyond (al-akhirah). . . . A 
rights discourse sustainable within Islam flows from metaphysical and spiritual 
considerations that at the very least do not contradict religion, and ideally derive from 
it.”44  Thus, he maintains, “If religion is not relevant for all spheres of activity, it is simply 
not religion, as far as believers are concerned.”45   
Hellyer further observes that, in contradistinction to Islam, “Rights discourse has 
different points of departure and remains a secular discourse at least in its origins. 
Rights accorded to the individual in Islam do not find their authenticity or authority by 
claiming interpretations of rationality or reason, even though reason and the rational 
may indeed be brought to bear on the issue in deeply influential ways.”46  The heart of 
the human being in Islam is thought to contain the divine, Hellyer notes, in a way that 
makes the individual human being a “representative of God Himself on earth (khalifat-l-
Allah fi-l’ard)”47 and demands a purity and comprehensiveness of submission in most, if 
not all, areas of life in a way that is challenging for secular conceptions of human rights.  
Yet, that very notion of a divine element in each human being provides perhaps a 
stronger foundation for human rights than other claimed rationales. 
2.3 Christianity.   
The development of human rights in the Western Christian48 tradition that has 
been so influential in the modern development of human rights has its origins both in 
Jewish law and in classical Roman understandings of rights and liberties, particularly as  
elaborated in the medieval and early modern period.  These Roman understandings 
form an intricate latticework of arguments about individual and group rights and liberties 
which were eventually informed and transformed by Stoic and Christian ideas.  Both 
 
44 Hisham A. Hellyer, “Worldviews and Universalisms: Islam and the West,” in Religion and Rights: The 
Oxford Amnesty Lectures, ed. Wes Williams (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 2011), 88. 
45 Ibid., 89. 
46 Ibid., 90. 
47 Ibid.  
48For reasons of space we omit here a discussion of human rights principles in the smaller, but very 
diverse, tradition of the Orthodox Churches of Eastern Christianity.  For this see John McGuckin, “The 
Issue of Human Rights in Byzantium and the Orthodox Tradition,” in Christianity and Human Rights, 173-
89; John Witte, Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux, eds. Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for 
Souls (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009). 
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before and after the Christianization of Rome in the fourth century C.E., classical 
Roman jurists sometimes used the Latin term “ius” to identify a subjective “right” in the 
sense of a person, a subject, “having a right” against another that could be defended 
and vindicated.  These ideas would later be developed by medieval Catholic canonists 
and moralists and expanded by later neo-scholastic writers.   
The rediscovery of the ancient texts of Roman law in the late eleventh and twelfth 
centuries–made available to Western Christian scholars in Latin translations from the 
Arabic versions in use by Muslim scholars in the Middle East and in such polyglot and 
interreligious centers as Cordoba in the Andalusia region of Spain49--helped to trigger a 
renaissance of subjective rights talk in the West.  Medieval jurists differentiated all 
manner of rights and liberties.  They grounded these rights and liberties in the law of 
nature (lex naturae) or natural law (ius naturale), and associated them variously with a 
power (facultas) inhering in rational human nature and with the property (dominium) of a 
person or the power (potestas) of an office of authority (officium).   
Medieval jurists repeated and glossed many of the subjective rights and liberties 
set out in Roman law–especially the public rights and powers of rulers, the private rights 
and liberties of property.  They also set out what they called the “rights of liberty” (iura 
libertatis), which comprised a whole series of freedoms, powers, immunities, 
protections, and capacities for different groups and persons.50  Among the most 
important of these were the rights protecting the “freedom of the church” from secular 
authorities.  These early formulations of religious group rights against secular authorities 
would become axiomatic for the later Western tradition – and now figure prominently in 
modern concepts of religious autonomy, corporate free exercise rights, and the rights of 
legal personality for religious groups. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, canon law 
jurists refined the rights further, promulgating rules and rights that are still at the heart of 
the modern Code of Canon Law that governs Catholicism worldwide.   
These rights set out at medieval Catholic canon law were, in practice, often 
narrowly defined in scope and limited in application.  Medieval Christendom was no 
liberal democracy—as the blood of too many martyrs can attest.  But a great number of 
the basic public, private, penal, and procedural rights that are recognized by state and 
international political authorities today were prototypically formed in this medieval 
period. These basic rights formulations came to be seen as “natural rights”–rights 
inhering in a person’s human nature—regardless of that person’s status within church, 
state, or society.  This natural rights theory was greatly expanded in the later Middle 
Ages and early modern periods through the work of such scholars as William of 
Ockham, Bartolomé de las Casas, Francisco de Vitoria, Fernando Vázquez, Francisco 
Suarez, and others.  Vitoria was especially prescient in pressing for the rights of 
 
49 See Maria Rosa Menocal, The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a 
Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 2002); Richard Rubenstein, 
Aristotle’s Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated 
the Dark Ages (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003). 
50 Quoted in Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1997), 57. 
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indigenous peoples as well as the rights of soldiers and prisoners of war – both critical 
topics in the budding international law of the day.   
This development of human rights within the medieval and early modern Catholic 
tradition gave way in subsequent centuries to contestation around the notion of human 
rights in general, and of religious human rights in particular.  Much of this was reaction 
to the rise of a modernity in which principles of Enlightenment liberalism seemed to be 
winning the day in ways that threatened Church authority and autonomy and which 
seemed inadequate buffers against the rise of forces of communism, fascism, and 
revolution. As Catholic theologian Charles Curran has observed, the Church “staunchly 
opposed human rights in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and well into the 
twentieth century,” resisting both “modern liberties and the human rights associated with 
them.”51 Pope Leo XIII, author of the papal social encyclicals that laid the groundwork 
for the tradition of Catholic social thought that subsequently led the articulation of all 
manner of rights and duties in the name of social justice and the common good, was 
also opposed to religious liberty and the freedom of worship as contraventions of  “the 
chiefest and holiest human duty”52 to the one true God in the one true religion.  It would 
be seventy-five years before Pope John XXIII would support the concept of human 
rights in the encyclical Pacem in terris and two more years before the Second Vatican 
Council in 1965, under the influence of the American Jesuit theologian John Courtney 
Murray would embrace the right to religious freedom for all human beings.  In 
recounting these developments, Curran argues that the more recent teachings of Pope 
John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI have returned in ways, to the earlier privileging of 
truth over freedom when it comes to religion and human rights.53 
While “freedom of the church” was the initial manifesto of the twelfth-century 
Papal Revolution, “freedom of the Christian” was the initial manifesto of the sixteenth-
century Protestant Reformation.   Martin Luther, Thomas Cranmer, Menno Simons, 
John Calvin, and other leading sixteenth-century Protestant reformers all turned to 
Biblical texts to press for rights.  They were particularly drawn to the many New 
Testament aphorisms on freedom. They were also drawn to the Bible’s radical calls to 
equality.54  These and other biblical passages inspired Luther and his colleagues to 
demand freedom of the individual conscience from intrusive canon laws and clerical 
controls, freedom of political officials from ecclesiastical power and privileges, and 
freedom of the local clergy from central papal rule and oppressive princely controls.   
One important Protestant contribution to Western rights talk was to link human 
rights with biblical duties.  Early Protestants believed that God had given each human 
the freedom needed to choose to follow the commandments of the faith.  Freedoms and 
commandments, rights and duties belonged together in their view. To speak of one 
without the other was ultimately destructive.  Rights without duties to guide them quickly 
 
51 Charles E. Curran, “Human Rights in the Roman Catholic Tradition,” in Religion and Rights: The Oxford 
Amnesty Lectures, Wes Williams, ed. (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 2011), 73. 
52 Ibid. 73, quoting Pope Leo XIII, Libertas praestantisssimum (1888). 
53 See ibid., 78-81. 
54 Galatians 3:28, 5:1,13; 2 Corinthians 3:17; John 8:32,36; Romans 8:21 (Revised Standard Version).;  
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became claims of self-indulgence.  Duties without rights to exercise them quickly 
became sources of deep guilt.  Protestants thus translated the moral duties set out in 
the Bible into reciprocal rights.   
Protestants focused first on the duties set out in the Decalogue, or Ten 
Commandments, which they took to be the most pristine summary of the natural law.  
The First Table of the Decalogue, they noted, prescribes duties of love that each person 
owes to God—to honor God and God’s name, to observe the Sabbath day of rest and 
holy worship, to avoid false gods and false swearing.  The Second Table prescribes 
duties of love that each person owes to neighbors—to honor one’s parents and other 
authorities, not to kill, not to commit adultery, not to steal, not to bear false witness, not 
to covet.   A person’s duties toward God can be cast as the rights of religion. Each 
person’s duties towards a neighbor, in turn, can be cast as a neighbor’s right to have 
that duty discharged.  Starting with this biblical logic, Protestants writers spun out 
endless elaborations of rights based on other biblical duties toward the poor and needy, 
widows and orphans, slaves and sojourners, the persecuted and imprisoned, the sick 
and the grieving, and other vulnerable parties to food, shelter, support, nurture, comfort, 
education, housing, and more.   
Another major Protestant contribution to the religious foundation of rights was its 
emphasis on the role of the individual believer in the economy of salvation.  The 
Protestant Reformation did not invent the individual or individual rights.  But sixteenth-
century Protestant reformers gave new emphasis to the (religious) rights and liberties of 
individuals at both religious law and civil law. The Anabaptist doctrine of adult baptism, 
in particular, built on a voluntarist understanding of religion in which believers were 
called to make a conscientious choice to accept the faith—metaphorically, to scale the 
wall of separation between the fallen world and the perfection of Christ in the realm of 
religion.  Later Free Church followers converted this cardinal image into a powerful 
platform of liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion, and separation of church and 
state—not only for Christians but eventually for all peaceable believers.  Their views 
had a great influence on the formation protections of religious liberty in the American 
Constitution.  They would later come to expression in international human rights 
instruments that guaranteed the right freely to choose and change one’s religion. 
An important contribution to Western rights talk was the Protestant logic of 
revolution against tyrants who persistently and pervasively violated the people’s 
“fundamental rights.”  Protestant jurists and theologians developed a theory of political 
revolution that was based effectively on a Christian government contract or covenant 
theory.  Every political government, they argued, is formed by a tacit or explicit covenant 
or contract sworn between the rulers and their subjects before God. If any of the people 
violate the terms of this political covenant and become criminals, God empowers the 
rulers to prosecute and punish them, up to and including the death penalty in extreme 
cases.  In turn, if any of the rulers violate the terms of the political covenant and become 
tyrants, God empowers the people to resist and to remove them from office, through 
lethal force if necessary.   
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The issue that remained for early modern Protestant political theorists was how 
to determine which rights were so “fundamental,” so “inalienable,” that, if chronically and 
pervasively breached by a tyrant, triggered the foundational right to organized 
resistance and revolt against the tyrant.  The first and most important rights, they 
reasoned, had to be the people’s religious rights. Christians, after all, are first and 
foremost the subjects of God and called to honor and worship God above all else.  If the 
magistrate breaches these religious rights, then nothing can be sacred and secure any 
longer.  By 1650, Protestants had used this logic to develop and defend almost every 
one of the “fundamental rights and liberties” that would appear, a century and a half 
later, in the United States Bill of Rights of 1791.  They set out these fundamental rights 
in detailed constitutions and bills of rights written for the Netherlands, Scotland, 
England, and the American colonies in the seventeenth century. 
A third major Protestant contribution to Western rights talk was its development 
of new understandings of the relationship of church and state, and new ways of 
constructing the rights of the church.  The Protestant Reformation permanently broke 
the unity of Western Christendom under central papal rule, and thereby laid the 
foundations for the modern constitutional system of confessional pluralism.  Particularly 
prescient was the Anabaptist Reformation idea of building a “Scheidingsmaurer,” a “wall 
of separation” between the redeemed realm of religion and the fallen realm of the world.  
Anabaptist religious communities were ascetically withdrawn from the world into small, 
self-sufficient, intensely democratic communities, governed internally by biblical 
principles of discipleship, simplicity, charity, and Christian obedience.   
Also influential was the Calvinist model of governing the church as a 
democratically-elected consistory of pastors, elders, and deacons.  These consistories 
featured separation among the offices of preaching, discipline, and charity, and a fluid, 
dialogical form of religious polity and policing centered around collective worship, the 
congregational meeting, and the democratic election of religious officials with term 
limits.  Later Calvinists in Europe and North America would use these democratic 
church polities as prototypes for democratic state polities with separation of powers, 
democratic election, term limits, and town hall meetings with the right of all members to 
petition the political authorities.  Both Calvinists and Anabaptists were critical in the 
development of the logic of separation of religion and the state that dominates modern 
Western constitutionalism. 
 3. Religion and the Modern International Human Rights Framework 
The rights and liberties guaranteed in contemporary international and national 
legal systems, although having roots developed over millennia in various religious, 
philosophical, and cultural traditions, owe their definitive modern formulation to the 
promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948).  
Subsequent international instruments have refined these and elaborated additional 
protections, including for religious rights and liberties: (1) the International Covenant on 
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Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”) (1966),55 (2) the United Nations Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief (the “Declaration on Religion or Belief”) (1981),56 (3) the Concluding Document of 
the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the “Vienna Concluding 
Document”) (1989),57 and (4) the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (the “Minorities Declaration”) 
(1992).58   
The ICCPR distinguishes between the right to freedom of religion or belief and 
the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief. The right to freedom of religion (the 
freedom to have, to alter, or to adopt a religion of one’s choice) is an absolute right from 
which no derogation may be made and which may not be restricted or impaired in any 
manner.  This is a contested issue today among some Muslim groups who recognize 
the right to enter Islam, but not to exit it; those who choose to leave the Muslim faith are 
apostates who deserve death.  Freedom to manifest or exercise one’s religion 
(individually or collectively, publicly or privately) may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The requirement of necessity 
implies that any such limitation on the manifestation of religion must be proportionate to 
its aim to protect any of the listed state interests.59 The ICCPR also calls for States 
Parties to prohibit “any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence” and provides that the principles of 
equal treatment and nondiscrimination should apply to religion or belief.   
The Declaration on Religion or Belief elaborates the religious liberty provisions 
adumbrated in the ICCPR.  Like the ICCPR, the Declaration on its face applies to 
believers both “individually or in community,” and “in public or in private.”  The 
Declaration catalogues a number of specific rights to “freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion,” including the rights to worship or assemble and to establish and maintain 
places for these purposes; to establish and maintain appropriate charitable or 
humanitarian institutions; to make, acquire, and use articles and materials related to 
religious rites or customs; to write, issue, and disseminate relevant publications in these 
areas; to teach a religion or belief in suitable places; to solicit and receive voluntary 
financial and other contributions; to train, appoint, elect, and designate appropriate 
leaders; to observe days of rest and celebrate holy days; and to establish and maintain 
communications with individuals and communities, both nationally and internationally, 
 
55 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 
16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. (Dec. 16, 1966), Arts. 18, 20/2, 2, 26. 
56 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 151), U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981). 
57 Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 28 I.L.M. 527. 
58 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic 
Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/135/Annex, 18 December 1992.  
59 See Symposium, “The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion and Belief,” 
Emory International Law Review 19 (2005): 465-1320. 
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on matters of religion and belief.60 Additional provisions detail the religious rights of 
parents and children.  The Declaration also includes more elaborate prohibitions than 
the ICCPR on religious discrimination and intolerance, baring religious “discrimination 
by any State, institution, group of persons, or person.”  Accordingly, the Declaration 
calls on all States Parties “to take effective measures to prevent and eliminate” such 
discrimination “in all fields of civil, economic, political, social, and cultural life.” The 
Vienna Concluding Document expands the religious liberty norms of the 1981 
Declaration.  It provides an elaborate catalogue of the rights of religious groups to 
govern their own polity, property, and personnel, to establish charities, schools, and 
seminaries, to have access to literature, media, and religious worship items. 
The refinement and articulation of these religious group rights coincides with the 
development in international human rights law of the “right to self-determination” of 
religious, cultural, or linguistic communities. The 1992 Minorities Declaration clearly 
spells out the government’s obligation to each of these groups to protect and encourage 
conditions for the promotion of the concerned group identities of minorities, afford to 
minorities the special competence to participate effectively in decisions pertinent to the 
group to which they belong, not discriminate in any way against any person on the basis 
of his or her group identity, and take actions to secure their equal treatment at law. The 
Minorities Declaration further provides that: “States shall take measures to create 
favorable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their 
characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, 
except where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to 
international standards.”61  The recent 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples elaborates these rights of self-determination even further for 
indigenous, aboriginal, or first peoples and their distinctive sites and rites of religious 
identity and practice.62 
These international instruments highlight the issues about religion that now 
regularly confront national and international tribunals: How to protect religious and 
cultural minorities within a majoritarian religious culture—particularly controversial 
groups sometimes pejoratively referred to as “sects” or “cults” who often bring charges 
of religious and cultural discrimination.  How to define the limits of religious and anti-
religious exercises and expressions that cause offense or harm to others or elicit 
charges of blasphemy, defamation, or sacrilege.  How to adjudicate challenges that a 
 
60 The 1990 Copenhagen Document adds to the 1981 Declaration “the right of everyone to have 
conscientious objection to military service” and calls for “various forms of alternative service … in 
combatant or civilian service” “which are compatible with the reasons for conscientious objections to 
military service.”  Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of 
the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(1990), Principle 18, reprinted in OSCE/ODIHR, Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to 
Religion or Belief (June, 2004), p. 45. 
61 1992 Minorities Declaration, art. 4.2.  
62 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN GAOR, A/61/L.67/Annex (2007).  
For a discussion of the challenges that consideration of indigenous religion poses to contemporary 
human rights discourse, see Ronald Niezen, “Indigenous Religion and Human Rights,” in Religion and 
Human Rights, __. 
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state’s proscriptions or prescriptions run directly counter to core claims of conscience or 
cardinal commandments of the faith.  How to balance private and public exercises of 
religion, including the right to proselytize.  How to balance conflicts between the rights of 
parents to bring up their children in the faith and the duties of the state to protect the 
best interest of the child.   How to protect the distinct religious needs of prisoners, 
soldiers, refugees, and others who don’t enjoy ready access to traditional forms and 
forums of religious worship and expression. These issues all highlight important 
dimensions of the right to religious freedom in a religiously pluralistic and globalized 
world. 
Many religion and human rights issues involve religious groups whose right to 
govern themselves free from unwarranted state intrusion is itself often a critical issue.  
How to negotiate the complex needs and norms of religious groups without according 
them too much sovereignty over their members or their members too little relief from 
secular courts.  How to balance the rights of religious groups to self-governance with 
the guarantees to individuals of freedom from discrimination based on religion, gender, 
culture, and sexual orientation.  How to balance the rights of competing religious groups 
who each claim access to a common holy site, or a single religious or cultural group 
whose sacred site is threatened with desecration, development, or disaster.  How to 
protect the relations between local religious communities and their foreign co-
religionists.  How to adjudicate intra- or interreligious disputes that come before secular 
tribunals for resolution.  How to determine the proper levels of state cooperation with 
and support of religious officials and institutions in the delivery of vital social services – 
child care, education, charity, medical services, disaster relief, among others.  These 
concerns typically arise in the context of the official registration process that many 
states require religion to undertake in order to a be allows to resist, in cases of 
interreligious competition and prestige, and in cases in which believers invoke the 
protection of the state from human rights abuses perpetrated by other members and 
institutions of their faith. 
4. The Place of Religion in Human Rights Today 
A number of distinguished commentators have argued that religion should have 
no place in a modern regime of human rights.  Religions may well have been the 
sources of human rights in earlier eras, and may even have helped to inspire the 
modern human rights revolution. Nonetheless, these skeptics argue, religion has now 
outlived its utility.  Religion is, by its nature, too expansionistic and monopolistic, too 
patriarchal and hierarchical, too antithetical to the very ideals of pluralism, toleration, 
and equality inherent in a human rights regime.  Religion is also too dangerous, divisive, 
and diverse in its demands to be accorded special protection.  Religion is better viewed 
as just one another category of liberty and expression and given no more preference 
than its secular counterparts.  Indeed, to accord religion special human rights treatment 
is in effect to establish it and to discriminate against non-religious parties in the same 
position.  Purge religion entirely from special consideration, this argument concludes, 
and the human rights paradigm will thrive.  
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It is undeniable that religion has been, and still is, a formidable force for both 
political good and political evil, and that it has fostered benevolence and belligerence, 
peace and pathos of untold dimensions.  The proper response to religious belligerence 
and pathos, however, cannot be to deny that religion exists or to dismiss it to the private 
sphere and sanctuary.  The proper response is to castigate the vices and to cultivate 
the virtues of religion, to confirm those religious teachings and practices that are most 
conducive to human rights, democracy, and rule of law. 
First, without religion, many rights are cut from their roots.  Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the theory and law of human rights are neither new nor secular in 
origin.  Human rights are, in no small part, the modern political fruits of ancient religious 
beliefs and practices.  Religious communities must be open to a new human rights 
hermeneutic—fresh methods of interpreting their sacred texts and traditions that will 
allow them to reclaim their essential roots and roles in the cultivation of human rights.  
Religious traditions will not allow secular human rights norms to be imposed on them 
from without; they must (re)discover them from within.   
Second, without religion, the regime of human rights becomes infinitely 
expandable.  Many religious communities adopt and advocate human rights in order to 
protect religious duties.  Religious rights provide the best example of the organic linkage 
between rights and duties.  Without the link, rights become abstract, with no obvious 
limit on their exercise or their expansion, with no ontological grounding that keeps them 
from becoming a simple wish list of individual preferences.  
Third, many religious traditions cannot conceive of, nor accept, a system of rights 
that excludes, deprecates, or privatizes religion.  For these traditions, religion is 
inextricably integrated into every facet of life.  Religious rights are thus an inherent part 
of rights of speech, press, assembly, and other individual rights as well as ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic, and similar associational rights.  No system of rights that ignores or 
deprecates this cardinal place of religion can be respected or adopted. 
Fourth, the simple state versus individual dialectic of many modern human rights 
theories leaves it to the state alone to protect and provide rights.  In reality, the state is 
not, and cannot be, so omni-competent.  Numerous “mediating structures” stand 
between the state and the individual, religious institutions prominently among them.  
They play a vital role in the cultivation and realization of rights.  They can create the 
conditions (sometimes the prototypes) for the realization of civil and political rights.  
They can provide a critical (sometimes the principal) means to meet rights of education, 
health care, child care, labor organizations, employment, artistic opportunities, among 
others. They can offer some of the deepest insights into norms of stewardship, 
solidarity, and servanthood that lie at the heart of rights concerned with the 
environment. 
Finally, without religion, human rights norms have no enduring narratives to 
ground them.  There is, of course, some value in simply declaring human rights norms 
of “liberty, equality, and fraternity” or “life, liberty, and property”—if for no other reason 
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than to pose an ideal against which a person or community might measure itself, to 
preserve a normative totem for later generations to make real.  But, ultimately, these 
abstract human rights ideals of the good life and the good society depend on the visions 
and values of human communities and institutions to give them content and 
coherence—to provide what Jacques Maritain once called “the scale of values 
governing [their] exercise and concrete manifestation.”63  It is here that religion must 
play a vital role. Religion is an ineradicable condition of human lives and human 
communities. 
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